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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the important issue of the effects of trade liberalization on labor 
market job flows.  It studies the case of Ukraine where we view the sudden openness 
of the economy to trade as a quasi-natural experiment.  We use disaggregated data on 
manufacturing industries and customs data on trade flows taking account of shifting 
trade patterns after the disintegration of CMEA trade regime.  We provide some first 
evidence that 3-digit NACE sector job flows are predominantly driven by 
idiosyncratic factors within industries.  Other things equal, there is increased labor 
shedding as larger non-state share in industry relates to less job creation and more job 
destruction.  Trade openness does affect job flows in Ukrainian manufacturing 
disproportionately according to trade orientation.  We find that while trade with CIS 
decreases job destruction, trade with the EU increases excess reallocation mainly 
through job creation. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The flexibility of labor markets is an important feature of well-functioning market 
economies.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, 1992) and Baldwin, Dunne and 
Haltiwanger (1998) report that in the U.S. and in Canada roughly one in every ten 
jobs is created and one in every ten jobs is destroyed each year.  Flexibility of the 
labor market is important because it permits the rapid reallocation of resources to the 
most efficient uses and thus it may be vital for economic growth.  Labor reallocation 
is to a large extent driven by job creation and job destruction.  Businesses react 
continuously to shocks by changing output and input levels at a high pace leading to 
substantial destruction and creation of jobs at high frequencies.  Job creation and job 
destruction are thus intimately linked to productivity growth.  Firms (sectors) that 
engage in restructuring destroy low productivity jobs and create high productivity 
ones, leading to large job turnover, an increase in labor productivity and better general 
performance.  
A high degree of job reallocation, while beneficial for an economy as a whole, 
can, however, have large negative effects for those workers who are displaced from 
their jobs.  There is ample evidence, in particular from Anglo-Saxon labor markets, 
that the average displaced worker faces prolonged non-employment spells and long-
term earnings losses (see e.g. Kuhn (2002) and Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan 
(1993)).   
Labor reallocation, brought on by the reallocation of jobs across firms and sectors, 
is an especially pertinent issue in transition economies.  The reallocation of labor from 
inefficient firms (usually non-restructured state and privatized firms) to efficient ones 
(usually new private and restructured state and privatized firms) increases overall 
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labor productivity and enhances efficiency during the transition from plan to market 
(Blanchard (1997)).  How job creation and destruction have contributed to this 
reallocation process across businesses and sectors has been the subject of a growing 
literature on job gross flows in Central Europe and the CIS, which is summarized in 
Haltiwanger, Lehmann and Terrell (2003).  Like in mature capitalist economies, the 
welfare gains generated by the ongoing process of labor reallocation are, however, not 
distributed evenly.  Many low-skilled and older workers who are displaced from their 
jobs incur large costs above all in the form of long spells of non-employment, as 
Lehmann, Philips and Wadsworth (2005) and Lehmann, Pignatti and Wadsworth 
(2005) have shown for Estonia and Ukraine where data on displacement are available.     
Beneficial and detrimental outcomes of labor reallocation induced by changing 
trade patterns have been widely discussed in the literature on the impact of 
globalization on Western domestic labor markets.  However, there are only a few 
papers that look at how trade affects job creation and job destruction directly.  While 
Klein, Schuh and Triest (2003) estimate the effects of real exchange rates on job 
creation and job destruction for the US manufacturing industry, Lewinsohn (1999) 
investigates the influence of trade liberalization on job creation and destruction in 
Chile.   
With respect to the impact of shifting trade patterns on domestic labor markets, 
transition economies provide something of a quasi-natural experiment.  Under central 
planning the state had a foreign trade monopoly.  Firms were not in principle acting 
autonomously in export markets.  At the same time, enterprises were sheltered from 
import competition.  Firms in most centrally planned economies were completely 
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isolated from world markets.1  With the start of transition the foreign trade state 
monopoly was abolished and trade was liberalized. As a consequence of trade 
liberalization, we see a strong re-orientation of trade away from the defunct CMEA 
trade area to Western markets, in particular to the EU.  In addition, trade liberalization 
implies that many firms engage autonomously in fast growing Western export 
markets.  The same firms or other firms have to deal themselves with import 
competition.  Firms’ engagement in export markets and the abrupt exposure to import 
competition imply that some sectors of industry in transition countries open up to the 
world economy over a short time horizon at a very rapid pace.  Industrial sectors in 
mature capitalist economies have opened up much more gradually over the eighties 
and nineties, making it difficult to isolate the effect of changing trade patterns on 
employment adjustment in domestic labor markets. 
We try to take advantage of the rapid opening up of one transition country, 
Ukraine.  As we shall show in the next section, Ukrainian trade flows to and from 
areas outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have increased 
dramatically over the last decade.  We exploit this dramatic increase and investigate 
whether and how trade liberalization causally affects job creation and destruction in 
three-digit industrial sectors.  The sectoral gross job flows are based on establishment-
level data from the Ukrainian registry data for the years 1993-2000.  In an earlier 
study, two of the authors used Ukrainian establishment level data from the Amadeus 
data base to look at the impact of trade liberalization on job gross flows at the 
establishment level in the late nineties (Konings, Kupets and Lehmann (2003)).  The 
 
1 In Poland and Hungary, economic reforms of the central planning system gave some autonomy to 
state-owned enterprises in the eighties. Some of the Hungarian and Polish enterprises did have trade 
relationships with Western firms already in the eighties as a consequence of these reforms (see e.g. 
Repkine and Walsh (1999) who study Polish enterprises). In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
where the Classical Planning System was less affected by economic reform throughout the Communist 
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present paper is complementary insofar as it extends the analysis to the sectoral level 
and augments the time dimension to nearly the entire last decade.  With data that have 
a substantial time series dimension we hope to better control for cyclical and 
idiosyncratic shocks.  Using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator we 
thus might be able to better isolate the effect of trade liberalization on gross job flows. 
The following section gives a short account of the developments of the industrial 
sector in Ukraine over the nineties and looks at the evolution of trade flows over the 
same period.  In the subsequent section we describe our data sources, briefly review 
the job flow measures that we employ in the analysis and sketch the construction of 
indices of trade openness at the sector level.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
raw correlations of the trends of job flows and of trade orientation of sectors.  Section 
four develops the estimation framework and reports results from our GMM 
estimations.  The final section offers some conclusions.  
 
II. Ukrainian Industry and Trade in the Nineties 
 
Reform efforts to transform the Ukrainian economy have been either non-
existent or very inconsistent in the nineties of the last century, which is the analyzed 
period in this paper. The capture of the state by a few oligarchic groups, the exclusion 
of the majority of the population from the decision making process and weak property 
rights resulted in stagnancy, corruption and a collapse in output for most of the decade 
(Aslund, 2002).  In the first half of the nineties runaway inflation, bordering for a 
prolonged period on hyperinflation, was one of the manifestations of the poor 
economic policies that brought Ukraine on the brink of collapse.  Only towards the 
 
regime, the foreign trade monopoly of the state was not touched until the implosion of the centrally 
planned economy.    
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end of the nineties were serious reforms undertaken that loosened the grip of the 
oligarchs and that spurned robust and unabated growth for the first time since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 Figure 1, which shows the trends of production and employment, makes the 
point quite forcefully that the nineties were a lost decade for Ukraine.  After an 
extremely sharp contraction of industrial output in 1993 (the year of the 
hyperinflation) we see a five-year trough until some recovery in 1999 and 2000 
occurs.  By the end of the decade industrial output had “recovered” to only about 60% 
of the pre-transition level, which points to a dismal performance in comparison with 
all those Central and East European transition countries that have not been affected by 
armed conflict.  
 It is also striking that employment shows a steady decline hinting at 
substantial labor shedding throughout the period.  This labor shedding was driven by 
large job destruction as Table 1 makes clear.  Throughout the decade we see job 
destruction rates at levels that are observed in Western economies with rather flexible 
labor markets (Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)), while job creation rates are small in 
international perspective.  What is interesting, though, is that job creation does take 
place at all during this period and that it does gather pace in 1999 and 2000 when 
industrial output grows.  Despite the enormous fall in industrial output and the 
cumulative employment contraction of roughly 40%, jobs are continuously 
reallocated at an increasing pace as the secular rise of the excess job reallocation 
demonstrates. 
 How much trade contributes to this reallocation is the focus of the paper.  A 
first cursory look at Ukrainian trade flows (Figures 2 and 3) yields two striking facts.  
First, the above-mentioned re-orientation from CIS to Western economies that one 
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generally observes for transition countries is clearly revealed by the shifting trade 
patterns in Ukraine.  Both exports and imports are re-directed away from the CIS to 
the EU and the rest of the world (ROW represents all those areas that are not in the 
EU and in the CIS).  Second, we see a spectacular rise of EU and ROW trade flows 
throughout the decade, while CIS trade flows decline in the second half of the 
nineties.  This large increase in trade flows will be exploited in the analysis that 
follows. 
 
III. The Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on industry-level data for a panel of 95 three-
digit NACE mining and manufacturing industries in Ukraine over the 1994-2000 
period, containing information from three diverse sources.  The panel is restricted to 
the subset of Ukrainian industries for which data on job and trade flows are available 
over the whole period.  In unreported results, we have used bootstrap techniques to 
perform tests of the null hypothesis that gross job flows of all firms (including entry 
and exit) and gross job flows of continuous firms are determined by the same data 
generation process.  In all cases over the sample period, we were not able to reject the 
null hypothesis, which implies that entry and exit do not influence our results.  
Annual sectoral data on job creation, destruction and reallocation are 
constructed from the establishment-level registry data set from 1993 to 2000 provided 
by the State Statistical Committee of Ukraine (“Derzhkomstat”).2  Although the initial 
registry data also cover establishments from some non-industrial sectors (4.84% of the 
initial sample), we restrict our analysis of job flows to firms in mining, manufacturing 
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industries and electricity, gas and water supply (i.e. to 3-digit NACE sectors from 101 
to 410).3  The manufacturing sample covers about 80% of officially reported total 
industrial employment.  The data set that we use in the analysis comprises only firms 
that we can identify with certainty as continuing firms, i.e. firms that have positive 
employment at least for the two adjacent years.  Information on ownership is based on 
the ownership codes of the enterprises in the registries and is available only for 2000.4
Annual data on import and export flows come from the Ukrainian Customs Office 
data on import and export volumes in US dollars by countries of origin and 
destination disaggregated by the six-digit commodity groups according to the 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS).5   
Since we attempt to compare and contrast the role played by trade with the EU 
countries from that of trade with the CIS countries in altering employment in 
Ukrainian manufacturing, we focus our analysis on the data set consisting of export 
and import volumes in three trading areas: CIS countries, EU countries and the rest of 
the world (ROW).  We construct the following index of openness: (Expit + Impit) / 
(Expit + Impit + Prodit), which uses exports, imports and production of sector i in order 
to calculate the share of trade in total turnover.  For each industry, this index is then 
applied to the three trading areas, resulting in the three trade area-specific indices of 
openness shown in Appendix 1.  It is worth pointing out that these unique measures of 
 
2 Since the Derzkkomstat used the old classification of industries OKONKh (Classification of branches 
of national economy) till 2001 we converted 5-digit OKONKh industries to the 3-digit NACE sectors 
for our further analysis at the sectoral level.  
3 We also eliminated sectors 205 (Manufacture of other products of wood), 233 (Processing of nuclear 
fuel) and 372 (Recycling of non-metal waste) because there is insufficient number of observations for 
sectoral analysis. All prison-based enterprises (about 170 establishments) were excluded from the 
sample. 
4 For the moment, we can distinguish only between state and non-state (including collective, private 
and foreign) ownership  
5 HS codes were also converted to the 3-digit NACE sectors. In our study we exclude sectors 296 
(Manufacture of weapons and ammunition) and 362 (Manufacture of jewellery) because of non-
availability of trade flows data for the whole interval from 1993 to 2000, and then we base our analysis 
only on sectors used in the manufacturing sample of the Derzhkomstat data set 
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trade openness to three distinct trading areas allow us to use counterfactuals in our 
analysis since some industries remained closed to the shifting trading patterns before 
and even after the reform, while others increased their trade disproportionately in 
world markets. 
The three panels of Figure 4 depict the percentile distribution of the openness 
indices over the sample period.  What is evident is the large increase in trade openness 
over a relatively short period of time in many Ukrainian industrial sectors.  The 
median (50th percentile) value of the index rises from almost 1 percent in the 
beginning of the period to more than 20 percent at the end of 2000.  It is also striking 
that a large number of closed sectors stayed closed over the same years, as shown by 
the 10th and 25th percentile of the distribution.  Panel B, in addition, shows that this 
increase occurred differently and more unevenly for trade oriented towards CIS 
countries. 
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) gross job creation (pos) is 
defined as the sum of all employment gains in all expanding firms, while gross job 
destruction (neg) is the sum of all employment losses in all contracting firms in an 
economy or sector.  Usually gross job destruction is expressed as a positive number.  
These gross job flows can be transformed into rates by dividing them by the total 
amount of jobs available in an economy or sector.  The sum of the gross job creation 
rate and the gross job destruction rate is the gross job reallocation rate (gross), while 
the difference is the net aggregate employment growth rate (net) that can be observed 
in aggregate statistics.  A measure of churning or reallocation of jobs which is over 
and above the amount of job reallocation necessary to accommodate a given net 
aggregate employment growth rate is the excess job reallocation rate (excess) and is 
defined as the gross job reallocation rate minus the modulus of the net aggregate 
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employment growth rate.  We interpret excess as a measure of genuine labor 
reallocation within a sector. 
Job destruction dominates sectoral job flows throughout the sample period as 
we slice the data by trade openness.  Figure 5 shows a dominant job destruction rate 
for the lowest and highest quartiles of trade orientation with regard to all three trading 
areas.  However, in the latter part of the nineties job creation is rising and job 
destruction stagnant or falling leading to a larger excess job reallocation rate across 
the openness distribution.  So, genuine labor reallocation within sectors is rising 
towards the end of the decade no matter how open a sector is towards the respective 
trading area.  These presented raw data thus imply that labor reallocation might be 
predominantly driven by idiosyncratic factors and not by trade liberalization.  
Job destruction is, however, quite different across trade regimes.  It is more 
volatile and has a lower level in the more closed sectors across all three panels.  So, 
more trade openness seems to be correlated with more persistent and larger job 
destruction, resulting in unabated large labor shedding throughout the sample period.  
On the other hand, we see a marked downward trend in the job destruction rate and a 
rising job creation rate in those sectors that are relatively closed. So, labor shedding 
declines disproportionately in these sectors.   
 
IV. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Specification  
 
There is little theoretical and empirical work relating gross job flows and 
international trade (Klein, et. al., 2003a,b).  In addition, Haltiwanger, et. al. (1996) 
establish “no systematic relationship” between job flows and openness to trade in US 
manufacturing for 1973 to 1986.  To study the employment effects of exposure to 
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6 We determine the lag structure empirically with a general-to-specific approach to establish a more 
parsimonious representation of the data.  Initially, we used two lags on all variables.  We also estimated 
international trade in the Ukrainian industrial sectors, we closely follow Klein, et. al. 
(2003a) who study the costly adjustment to trade flows using detailed data on US 
manufacturing for the period 1973-1993.  We specify job flows as a function of trade 
flows that vary systematically by industry and control for other industry-specific 
effects (including privatization) and explicitly model dynamic adjustment of labor 
reallocation in sectors by including lagged dependent variables.  Earlier work has 
shown that adjustment costs in transition tend to differ in non-trivial ways according 
to industry and ownership.  We expect that opening of essentially closed (former 
CMEA) markets to international trade will affect different industries 
disproportionately.   
Thus, we study the effects of trade liberalization on job creation, destruction, 
and labor reallocation by analyzing differences in international exposure of industrial 
sectors in Ukraine controlling for idiosyncratic shocks and ownership structure at the 
end of period.  We construct three different measures of trade openness towards three 
different groups of countries (EU, CIS (former Soviet Union countries) and the rest of 
the world (ROW)).  In addition, we interact these indexes with a trade weighted 
(multilateral) real exchange rate to isolate the effects of relative prices and 
productivity differences according to industrial sectors at 3-digit level.  See Appendix 
2 for definition of these and other variables used in our estimation. 
We estimate these specifications using generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator to account for potential endogeneity problems.  The resulting 
general specification is6: 
 (1) 
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This equation is motivated by the model presented in Klein, et. al.(2003), where JFit is 
the job flow rates in 3-digit NACE industry i at time t.  These include job creation, 
destruction, net employment growth and excess reallocation rate.  OIit is defined as 
the trade openness variable (see Appendix 2) and Eit is the industry-specific real 
exchange rate.  Di captures the effect of privatization and ownership at the end of 
period.  We also include other industry-specific variables such as the coefficient of 
variation of real wages that affect job reallocation rates and time dummies to account 
for aggregate shocks.   
 In addition, we have specified Equation (1) to include the export share and 
import penetration ratio in industry, and have allowed for the exchange rate to enter 
both with and without the openness index interaction.  Since we expect that the 
changes in the exchange rate might have a direct influence on job creation and 
destruction (see Klein, et. al., 2003a), we have also accounted for the growth rate of 
the multilateral industry-specific real exchange rate in our specification.  These 
alternative specifications are not reported in the tables because they provide little 
difference to the results below.   
The panel structure (95 three-digit level industries over 6 years) of our sample 
allows us to study the dynamics of partial adjustment in the transition period as well 
as differing exposure to trade openness, with the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable among the other regressors in the model.  It is well accepted that in 
estimating these dynamic models with relatively large cross-sections over a short time 
period, 1994-2000, the fixed effects model yields inconsistent estimates.  Thus, as 
pointed out in Equation (1) above, we specify an error components model (random 
effects) with εit=λt+ηi+νit.  This, however, raises well-known additional problems 
 
(1) with the growth rate of the real exchange rate rather than the level, and found no significant 
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when lagged dependent variables are included in the model.  Thus, we resort to the 
use of the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation which has dominated 
recent studies of dynamic panel regressions.7  
In estimation we apply the asymptotically efficient (one-step) GMM 
advocated by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  This 
estimator usually exploits a different number of instruments in each time period.  We 
transform the data and allow lagged endogenous or predetermined variables to enter 
as instruments in the transformed equations.  By construction, the transformed error 
term does not contain ηi and orthogonality among the errors is preserved.  The 
original errors may be heteroskedastic but may not be autocorrelated, for which we 
test formally below, and we treat all variables in our models as potentially 
endogenous.  In addition, we check for serial correlation in the errors to establish 
consistency.  Diagnostics, reported in Tables 5 and 6, show that neither the robust 
Sargan nor MA(1) and MA(2) tests provides evidence to suggest that the assumption 
of serially uncorrelated errors (second-order) is impractical.  The choice of the 
instruments used also appears to be appropriate.8  These are reported in the 
diagnostics section of Tables 5 and 6 to whose main findings we now proceed. 
 
V. Main Hypotheses and Results 
 
 Changes in trading patterns have a direct effect on the labor demand in 
different industries and are thus closely related to the pace of job creation and 
 
differences. 
7 For background and a detailed discussion see Baltagi (1995, Ch.8).  For an overview, see Bond 
(2002) and Hall (2003). 
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destruction.  Trade theory provides little explanation as to the links, causes and effects 
of adjustment costs associated with job and worker reallocation.  As discussed earlier, 
previous work has generally focused on the effects of trade on net employment 
change and neglected other aspects of this process, namely gross job creation and 
destruction (Gourinchas, 1999 and Klein, et. al. 2003a). 
 We expect that job destruction will be both more volatile and larger than job 
creation following trade liberalization in Ukraine.  Job destruction caused by 
increased trade flows may exacerbate unemployment if workers do not reallocate to 
new jobs or exit the labor force (Lehmann, et al., 2005).  Job creation, on the other 
hand, may be constrained by the lower competitiveness of Ukrainian industries, and 
especially those industries that are initially either closed to trade with the EU or ROW 
or that have maintained strong trading ties to former CMEA area (CIS) countries.  
Open trade policies and flexible exchange rates increase excess job reallocation and 
stimulate growth as shown by Gourinchas (1999) and Greenway, et. al. (2002).  The 
latter authors point also to the importance of the existence of a credible counterfactual 
in evaluating the effects of trade liberalization on growth.  In the sample period we 
observe such counterfactuals since while some industries rapidly opened up to trade 
as transition progresses, others remained closed throughout the period (Figure 4). In 
addition, we expect that job flows are affected differently by the dispersion of trade 
openness across industries and trading areas.  Higher openness towards the EU, for 
example, is more likely to increase job creation and decrease job destruction, which is 
dominant in the initial stage of transition, and thus affects excess job reallocation.  
Real appreciation of the exchange rate may increase job destruction and decrease job 
creation.  Finally, we anticipate that the privatization processes and ownership 
 
8  Where possible, in addition to predetermined variables, we use the lagged differences and levels of 
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structure in industries with different trade exposure will influence job creation and job 
destruction propitiously. 
 While we consider trade liberalization in its various realizations an important 
determinant of job reallocation, we anticipate that industry-specific shocks will 
dominate the determination of gross job flows in the studied period. Our first results 
confirm this as the four sectoral job flow measures appear to be mainly driven by the 
lagged values of job creation and destruction.  Net employment growth is consistently 
dominated by job destruction, while excess job reallocation is propelled by job 
creation.  This finding indicates that idiosyncratic factors within industries explain 
most of the variation of costly employment adjustment in the Ukrainian 
manufacturing sectors which is in line with the evidence found in Davis, et. al. (1996). 
In addition, ownership structure seems to be strongly correlated with job flows, as 
revealed by the significant and large coefficients on the variable PRIV SHARE in both 
Tables 5 and 6.  A larger private share in an industry is associated with less job 
creation and more job destruction resulting in an increased labor shedding.  There is 
also weak evidence that an industry with a larger private share exhibits less excess job 
reallocation.  In our interpretation of the coefficients on PRIV SHARE we are careful 
not to suggest a causal effect of ownership structure of industries on employment 
adjustment since the variable we have constructed PRIV SHARE does not capture the 
evolving ownership distribution in industrial sectors over time.  It is instead an end-
of-period variable controlling for the cumulative ownership changes that have 
occurred in the industrial sectors in Ukraine over the intervening years.  
 Does trade liberalization affect sectoral job flows in Ukrainian manufacturing?  
In Table 5, we report a significant positive coefficient on the lagged openness index 
 
real industrial output as instruments in our regressions. 
 16
for EU trade in the job creation and excess job reallocation regressions.  This asserts 
that as industries become more exposed to trade and competition in EU markets over 
time, they reallocate jobs faster.  On the other hand, sectors engaging in more trade 
with the rest of the world show increased job destruction rates. 
 To account for different productivity and relative price shocks over time, we 
interact proxies for the industry-specific real exchange rate with the openness indices 
and report the results in Table 6.  While it is more difficult to disentangle the effects 
of trade on job flows using these new variables, the results suggest that openness and 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate affect job creation and job destruction 
disproportionately due to trade by country of origin and destination. The estimates of 
Table 6 show a small positive effect on increased job destruction rates for sectors 
trading with the rest of the world. Our data indicate that for the average sector a real 
depreciation within the CIS trading area is reflected by a real appreciation of relative 
prices towards the EU and ROW and vice versa. We, therefore, establish that sectors 
with more trade to CIS countries have declining job destruction rates primarily 
because of a depreciation of the real exchange rate within the ruble zone over the 
sample period.  The positive effect of increased openness to the EU trading area does 
not disappear when the index is interacted with the real exchange rate. We take this 
result as evidence that increased restructuring and job reallocation are brought about 
by stiffer competition in EU markets.  Finally, net employment growth occurs only in 
sectors that maintain strong trade ties in the CIS area. 
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VI. Conclusions 
This paper addresses an important issue: the effects of trade liberalization on 
gross job flows, an area that has been relatively neglected in the trade liberalization as 
well as in the job flows literature. It studies the labor market of Ukraine where we 
view the sudden opening up of the economy to world markets as a quasi-natural 
experiment.  We provide some evidence that 3-digit NACE sector job flows in 
Ukrainian manufacturing are mainly driven by idiosyncratic factors within industries. 
Trade is a factor of some but of minor importance in the determination of gross job 
flows, a finding well established in Western studies. In particular, we find that while 
trade with CIS decreases job destruction, trade with the EU increases excess 
reallocation mainly through job creation.     
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TABLES  
Table 1. Gross Job Flows in Manufacturing 
Year pos neg gross net exc N 
1993-94 0.009 0.108 0.118 -0.099 0.019 7768 
1994-95 0.016 0.098 0.114 -0.082 0.033 8023 
1995-96 0.019 0.105 0.123 -0.086 0.037 7897 
1996-97 0.018 0.113 0.132 -0.095 0.037 8163 
1997-98 0.022 0.091 0.113 -0.069 0.045 7670 
1998-99 0.030 0.094 0.124 -0.064 0.060 9066 
1999-2000 0.041 0.081 0.122 -0.041 0.081 8077 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Annual Employment Growth Rates: Firm level 
Year 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Mean StDev N 
93-94 -0.547 -0.332 -0.255 -0.158 -0.078 -0.007 0.043 0.086 0.304 -0.091 0.159 7768
94-95 -0.579 -0.321 -0.239 -0.137 -0.052 0.000 0.059 0.104 0.323 -0.073 0.164 8023
95-96 -0.750 -0.378 -0.273 -0.161 -0.068 0.000 0.061 0.108 0.347 -0.093 0.196 7897
96-97 -1.012 -0.405 -0.280 -0.163 -0.078 -0.004 0.055 0.121 0.522 -0.101 0.234 8162
97-98 -0.957 -0.386 -0.272 -0.145 -0.059 0.006 0.090 0.204 0.852 -0.071 0.254 7670
98-99 -1.283 -0.541 -0.333 -0.164 -0.063 0.014 0.131 0.300 1.077 -0.082 0.320 9066
99-00 -1.267 -0.588 -0.358 -0.167 -0.050 0.037 0.157 0.297 0.777 -0.082 0.309 8077
  
Table 3. Distribution of Annual Sectoral Job Creation Rates 
Year 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Mean StDev
93-94 0 0 0 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.030 0.071 0.226 0.013 0.029
94-95 0 0 0 0.002 0.008 0.023 0.045 0.061 0.156 0.016 0.024
95-96 0 0 0 0.003 0.009 0.024 0.048 0.087 0.318 0.023 0.046
96-97 0 0 0 0.002 0.010 0.021 0.038 0.086 0.143 0.018 0.027
97-98 0 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.018 0.032 0.045 0.067 0.104 0.023 0.020
98-99 0 0 0.002 0.008 0.025 0.046 0.070 0.090 0.428 0.034 0.049
99-00 0 0.003 0.011 0.019 0.033 0.060 0.090 0.120 0.219 0.044 0.038
 
Table 4. Distribution of Annual Sectoral Job Destruction Rates 
Year 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Mean StDev
93-94 0 0.018 0.038 0.064 0.113 0.146 0.184 0.212 0.263 0.111 0.057
94-95 0 0.007 0.017 0.045 0.085 0.130 0.193 0.222 0.405 0.095 0.071
95-96 0 0.008 0.026 0.050 0.106 0.156 0.215 0.286 0.404 0.116 0.080
96-97 0.011 0.022 0.033 0.075 0.114 0.160 0.196 0.241 0.369 0.121 0.067
97-98 0.006 0.022 0.035 0.060 0.100 0.144 0.171 0.199 0.555 0.107 0.070
98-99 0 0.012 0.017 0.069 0.111 0.148 0.212 0.301 0.433 0.118 0.080
99-00 0 0.011 0.028 0.070 0.103 0.135 0.179 0.207 0.335 0.104 0.060
 
Figure 1. Employment and Production in Ukrainian Industry, 1992-2000 
(1992=100) 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Ukrainian Exports, 1992-2001 (1996=100) 
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Figure 5. Trade openness and sectoral job flows in three trading areas 
 
(A)  EU countries – lower 25% 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
pos neg exc
 
EU countries – upper 25% 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
pos neg exc
 
(B)   CIS countries – lower 25% 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
pos neg exc
 
CIS countries – upper 25% 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
pos neg exc
 
(C)    ROW countries – lower 25% 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
pos neg exc
 
ROW countries – upper 25% 
 27
TABLE 5 
JOB FLOWS: GMM-system estimates: Dependent variable JOB CREATION, JOB 
DESTRUCTION, NET EMPLOYMENT GROWTH and EXCESS REALLOCATION 
Period 1994-2000, 576 Observations available for estimation 
Independent 
Variables 
JOB 
CREATION 
JOB 
DESTRUCTION 
NET 
EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH 
EXCESS 
REALLOCATION 
JCi(t-1) 0.284 
(4.51) 
0.048 
(0.77) 
0.236 
(2.42) 
0.378 
(5.23) 
JDi(t-1) 0.119 
(1.28) 
0.470 
(8.14) 
-0.351 
(-2.78) 
0.168 
(1.94) 
OI_EUit -0.039 
(-0.57) 
0.055 
(0.74) 
-0.094 
(-0.91) 
-0.091 
(-1.32) 
OI_EUi(t-1) 0.066 
(1.69) 
-0.077 
(-0.93) 
0.144 
(1.58) 
0.079 
(2.06) 
OI_CISit 0.031 
(0.35) 
0.015 
(0.19) 
0.016 
(0.11) 
0.037 
(0.50) 
OI_CISi(t-1) 0.062 
(1.19) 
-0.078 
(-1.14) 
0.139 
(1.50) 
0.065 
(1.26) 
OI_ROWit -0.005 
(-0.07) 
0.155 
(1.85) 
-0.160 
(-1.18) 
-0.004 
(-0.08) 
OI_ROWi(t-1) -0.072 
(-1.27) 
-0.078 
(-1.28) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.087 
(-1.28) 
Eit 0.011 
(0.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
0.015 
(0.56) 
0.020 
(1.59) 
PRIV SHAREi -0.203 
(-2.32) 
0.169 
(2.32) 
-0.373 
(-2.81) 
-0.106 
(-1.01) 
Diagnostics:     
MA(1) -1.822 -4.101 -2.591 -2.124 
MA(2) 1.172 0.113 -0.365 0.674 
Sargan Test 82.12 
(77) 
79.96 
(77) 
82.81 
(77) 
83.71 
(77) 
Wald Test for 
Time Dummies 
12.25 
(5) 
20.83 
(5) 
17.89 
(5) 
25.96 
(5) 
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NOTES: 1)  System GMM estimates are obtained by stacking (T-2) equations in first differences 
and in levels corresponding to periods 3,…,T. We then use lagged differences of the variables as 
instruments in levels (dated t-1, etc.) in addition to the instruments specified for the difference 
equations.  See Blundell and Bond (1998) 
2)  The t-statistic, reported in the parentheses below the point estimates, is corrected and robust 
to heteroskedasticity over industries and time.  A Constant and Time dummies are always included 
but not reported; the Wald test for the joint significance of those variables is reported in the last row 
of the table; it is a chi-square test under the null of no significance (degrees of freedom are in 
parenthesis).  MA(1) (and MA(2)) is a test of first-order (and second-order) serial correlation, based 
on the standardized first-difference residual autocovariances asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no autocorrelation.  Sargan’s test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, which is 
a chi-square under the null of no significance or instrument validity (degrees of freedom (number of 
restriction) given in parenthesis).  
 
TABLE 6 
JOB FLOWS: GMM-system estimates: Dependent variable JOB CREATION, JOB 
DESTRUCTION, NET EMPLOYMENT GROWTH and EXCESS REALLOCATION 
Period 1994-2000, 588 Observations available for estimation 
Independent 
Variables 
JOB 
CREATION 
JOB 
DESTRUCTION 
NET 
EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH 
EXCESS 
REALLOCATION 
JCi(t-1) 0.258 
(2.75) 
-0.020 
(-0.21) 
0.278 
(1.86) 
0.279 
(3.93) 
JDi(t-1) 0.076 
(1.09) 
0.469 
(9.18) 
-0.393 
(-4.30) 
0.152 
(2.25) 
OI_EUit*Eit -0.011 
(-1.08) 
0.012 
(0.91) 
-0.023 
(-1.36) 
-0.014 
(-1.55) 
OI_EUi(t-1)*Ei(t-1) 0.013 
(1.38) 
-0.011 
(-0.81) 
0.025 
(1.43) 
0.019 
(2.17) 
OI_CISit*Eit 0.015 
(0.95) 
-0.046 
(-2.74) 
0.061 
(2.20) 
0.025 
(1.72) 
OI_CISi(t-1)*Ei(t-1) -0.003 
(-0.42) 
0.032 
(1.98) 
-0.035 
(-1.67) 
-0.016 
(-1.33) 
OI_ROWit*Eit 0.005 
(0.46) 
0.024 
(1.88) 
-0.018 
(-0.99) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
OI_ROWi(t-1)*Ei(t-1) -0.010 
(-0.43) 
-0.022 
(-1.96) 
0.019 
(1.21) 
-0.002 
(0.19) 
PRIV SHAREi -0.104 
(-1.89) 
0.084 
(1.78) 
-0.189 
(-2.36) 
-0.075 
(-1.73) 
Diagnostics:     
MA(1) -1.947 -4.060 -2.518 -2.255 
MA(2) 1.078 0.740 -0.316 0.704 
Sargan Test 90.13 
(95) 
87.55 
(95) 
86.58 
(95) 
91.87 
(95) 
Wald Test for Time 
Dummies 
19.10 
(5) 
15.59 
(5) 
22.60 
(5) 
25.17 
(5) 
NOTES: 
1)  See 1) and 2) of Table 5. 
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 APPENDIX 1 
Definitions of variables used in estimation 
Variable Description Definition Source 
JCit Job creation rate in 
industry i in year t 
)EmpEmp(2/1
Emp
)1t(iit
Mp
pit
−
∈
+
∆∑
+
,  
where M+ = {p│∆Emppit > 0} 
Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises, 1993-
2000 
JDit Job destruction rate 
in industry i in year t 
)EmpEmp(2/1
Emp
)1t(iit
Mp
pit
−
∈
+
∆∑
−
,  
where M– = {p│∆Emppit  < 0} 
Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises, 1993-
2000 
JFit Job flow rates in 
industry i in year t 
{JCit, JDit, JRit, JNit, JEit} Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises, 1993-
2000 
OI_EUit Openness index with 
EU countries in 
industry i in year t ititit
itit
odPrEU_pImEU_Exp
EU_pImEU_Exp
++
+
where Exp_EU denotes exports 
to EU countries (nominal USD),  
Imp_EU denotes imports from 
EU countries (nominal USD), 
and Prod denotes sectoral 
production in nominal USD 
(converted from UHA using 
official average annual exchange 
rate) 
Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises for 
production, Ukrainian 
Customs Committee 
data on import and 
export volumes by 
countries of origin 
and destination 
OI_CISit Openness index with 
CIS countries in 
industry i in year t ititit
itit
odPrCIS_pImCIS_Exp
CIS_pImCIS_Exp
++
+
where Exp_CIS denotes exports 
to CIS countries (nominal USD),  
Imp_CIS denotes imports from 
CIS countries (nominal USD), 
and Prod denotes sectoral 
production in nominal USD 
(converted from UHA using 
official average annual exchange 
rate) 
Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises for 
production, Ukrainian 
Customs Committee 
data on import and 
export volumes by 
countries of origin 
and destination 
OI_ROWit Openness index with 
countries from the 
rest of the world in 
industry i in year t 
itit
itit
oPrROW_pImROW_Exp
ROW_pImROW_Exp
++
+
where Exp_ROW denotes 
exports to ROW countries 
(nominal USD),  
Imp_ROW denotes imports from 
Derzhkomstat registry 
of industrial 
enterprises for 
production, Ukrainian 
Customs Committee 
data on import and 
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ROW countries (nominal USD), 
and Prod denotes sectoral 
production in nominal USD 
(converted from UHA using 
official average annual exchange 
rate) 
export volumes by 
countries of origin 
and destination 
Eit Multilateral real 
exchange rate  ∑= −
3
1j
jt)1t(ij Ew , where j indexes 3 
trading areas (EU, CIS, ROW), 
Ejt denotes bilateral real 
exchange rate (UHA to Euro, 
Russian Ruble and USD 
correspondingly) defined as 
[ln(nominal exchange ratejt) 
+ln(ukrppit)-ln(ppijt)], and wij(t-1) 
denotes industry-specific trade 
share weights in the previous 
year 
National Bank of 
Ukraine 
(http://www.bank.gov
.ua) for the official 
exchange rates, 
OECD Economic 
Trends for PPI in EU 
countries, Russia in 
Figures for PPI in 
Russia, Ukrainian 
Economic Trends for 
PPI in Ukraine, BLS 
data base for US PPI 
Privsharei Share of non-state 
firms in sector i in 
2000 
 Derzhkomstat firm-
level data on 
ownership in 2000 
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APPENDIX 2 
Institutional Changes and Trade Regime 
 
Institutional changes in international trade regime in Ukraine 
 
Time Event 
November 
1994 
The system of export quotas and licenses, which had covered 40% of 
exports, was narrowed to include only grain, ferrous and nonferrous scrap, 
cast iron, and coal, in addition to goods subject to voluntary export restraint 
or other international agreements.  
A new system of export contract pre-registration was adopted; 20 categories 
of goods were originally subject to the registration requirement, in addition 
to all goods traded under barter arrangements 
December 
1994 
The state orders and contracts systems for foreign trade were eliminated 
January 1995 Export quotas and licenses on all above products except grain were 
eliminated  
March 1995  The scope of export contract pre-registration was limited to goods subject to 
the special export regime, voluntary export restraint, and actual or potential 
antidumping actions. 
A system of minimum indicative prices for a range of export products 
covering one-half of total exports was instituted 
December 
1995 
Indicative export prices were removed for all good except for goods subject 
to actual and prospective antidumping actions and voluntary export 
restraints. 
January 1996 Licensing requirement for grain exports was abolished. 
Import tariffs on many agricultural goods were raised to 30 %. 
April-May 
1996 
Export taxes, once fully eliminated, were reapplied to animals and skins in 
April 1996 and to ferrous and nonferrous metals and scrap in May 1996 
June 1996 Import duties of about 15% on coal and refined petroleum products were 
introduced. Specific or mixed ad-valorem /specific tariffs have been 
introduced for numerous food products, motor vehicles, tires, textiles and 
clothing, alcohol, tobacco, furs, and radio equipment. 
June 1997 Export surrender requirement was revoked 
March 1998  Limits on auto imports were imposed  
September 
1998 
Foreign exchange restrictions were re-introduced. 
Limits were imposed on the making of advance import payments. 
A 50% surrender requirement was introduced. 
July 1999 A uniform, nondiscriminatory import surcharge of 2% was introduced. 
The restriction on advance import payments was eliminated. 
September 
1999 
An export duty on sunflower seeds was introduced. 
January 2000 A uniform, nondiscriminatory import surcharge of 2% was eliminated. 
The number of excisable imported goods has decreased from 20 to 5 
categories (alcohol, tobacco, oil products, automobiles, jewelry). 
Sources: EBRD Transition Report 2002, IMF annual report on exchange arrangements and 
exchange restrictions (several issues) 
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